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Funding policy 
Lasting tensions in research policy-making — a 
delegation problem 
Dietmar Braun 
A basic paradox in funding policy is that policy-
makers want to guarantee maximum welfare 
benefits without violating the independence of 
scientists and their organisations. This article 
contends that this problem can be adequately 
conceptualised in terms of delegation and princi-
pal–agent theory. In the past, blind delegation 
and incentives were used to resolve the tension: 
more recently, efforts have been in quite a differ-
ent direction. The ‘steady state’ succeeds in real-
ising more society-oriented research but fails to 
reduce the tensions. ‘Delegation by contract’ and 
‘delegation to networks’ attack the estimation of 
costs by scientists linked to the efforts in politi-
cally or user-inspired research and can thus re-
duce the likelihood of moral hazard by scientists. 
They are ‘opening up’ the scientific system to 
user systems by changing the functioning of the 
basic structures of science whilst embodying two 
very different solutions. ‘Delegation by contract’ 
maintains a strong belief in the rationalisation of 
funding policy and in political guidance, while 
‘delegation to networks’ makes the state a ‘facili-
tator’ helping scientists and their institutions to 
self-organise networks of co-operation with user 
systems. 
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N AN ARTICLE on the “central planning of sci-
ence” published in Minerva in 1977, the famous 
science policy expert Joseph Ben-David resumed 
the main problem of funding policy in the following 
words: 
“The main problem of science policy … today 
is how to support research from governmental 
funds and yet to ensure the vigor, initiative, and 
independence of scientific institutions” (Ben-
David in Freudenthal, 1991, page 279). 
Twenty-five years later, the problem is still there 
despite theoretical progress and political experience 
in dealing with research development. This may be 
attributed to the fact that the problem is an antinomy 
or paradox, that is, a problem where equally rational 
but contradictory views exist and solutions are con-
sequentially hard to come by. The question remains 
on the agenda of funding policies and each govern-
ment in each country must often give a pragmatic 
answer hoping that it can in one way or another im-
plement policies that will respect both sides of the 
contradicting views. 
In the course of funding history, a large variety of 
political answers has been given. These have moved 
from one end of the paradox — complete freedom of 
scientific institutions — to the other — complete 
planning of scientific activities. I contend, neverthe-
less, that today we have entered a new period of 
dealing with the paradox, offering in many ways 
different answers from before. 
While the ‘classic’ period of funding policy has 
focused very much on the ‘either–or’ of state guid-
ance and scientific freedom, we are experiencing 
nowadays a shift in the discourse on funding policies 
I
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attempting to conciliate both sides either by ‘facili-
tating markets’ or by ‘facilitating networks’. Both 
discourses offer different recipes in funding policy. I 
will discuss in this article in what way these dis-
courses and linked strategies have succeeded in ap-
peasing the perennial conflict between the direction 
of scientific activities by external criteria and the 
independence of scientific institutions. 
I maintain that recent considerations of science 
policy in terms of delegation and principal–agent 
theory are a fruitful way to discuss developments in 
funding policy (see, for example, Braun, 1993; 
1998; Rip, 1994; Rip and van der Meulen, 1996; 
Guston, 1996; 2000; van der Meulen, 1998; Caswill, 
1998).1 The problems of the paradox can thus be 
analytically sharpened. I will endeavour therefore to 
describe different periods of funding policy after the 
Second World War in terms of modes of delegation. 
In order to do so, I will, first, discuss the underlying 
rationale of the funding paradox and then introduce 
the concept of delegation. 
Conceptual foundations 
The functional differentiation of modern societies is 
at the base of the lasting tensions in funding policy. 
The scientific system becomes the place for the ad-
vancement of knowledge. To create new knowledge, 
special procedures, norms, rewarding mechanisms, 
and institutionalisations are put into place character-
ising scientific activities and distinguishing them 
from other professional activities in society. The 
establishment of such science-specific mechanisms 
has allowed an unprecedented rise in knowledge of 
modern societies. 
While functional differentiation is necessary for 
the progress of knowledge, it also means a loss in co-
ordination and interaction between different functions 
and activities in society, while, at the same time, the 
interdependence between functions is growing. One 
of the major problems becomes how to guarantee that 
societies do not function at cross-purposes and, even 
more importantly, how to make sure that there are 
mutual benefits? In our context, this is the perennial 
problem of how scientific knowledge can be made 
accessible for users in society, politics and economy 
and how this knowledge can be made part of activities 
in other systems (technology transfer and so on).  
Evidently, the problem of how to integrate the scien-
tific world with other ‘worlds’ is one of the main, and 
today perhaps the most important, problem of funding 
policy-makers. 
What does functional differentiation of the ad-
vancement of knowledge mean for political deci-
sion-makers? Evidently, that the political system 
does not intend to, nor can it produce the knowledge 
necessary for its own functioning and that of other 
systems. It needs the co-operation of scientists to 
overcome the implicit lack of knowledge or, in other 
terms, the ‘information asymmetry’ inherent in func-
tional differentiation. The relationship between pol-
icy-makers and scientists becomes therefore a 
relationship of delegation where the one side, the 
policy-makers, asks the other side, the scientists, to 
do something for them that they cannot do them-
selves, because they lack the capabilities or the 
knowledge the scientists have (Coleman, 1990). 
If we accept this view of formalising the relation-
ships in funding policies between policy-makers and 
scientists, we observe three fundamental problems 
for policy-makers: 
• Getting scientists to do what politics wants (prob-
lem of responsiveness); 
• Being sure that they choose the best scientists 
(problem of adverse selection) 
• Being sure that scientists do their best to solve the 
problems and tasks delegated to them (moral  
hazard); 
• Knowing what to do (decision-making and prior-
ity-setting problem). 
I will focus in this article above all on the problems 
of responsiveness and of moral hazard. A promising 
way to deal with this question analytically is the use 
of utility functions. 
The principal–agent literature uses utility func-
tions to describe the dynamics and problems of ‘in-
complete contracts’. This can be used for our 
purposes. It needs two utility functions to understand 
the relationship between principal and agent. The 
basic rationale of the principal–agent approach is 
that the principal can only insufficiently observe 
what the agent does and that the agent has an interest 
in hiding relevant information about his performance 
in order to ‘defect’, that is to reduce his efforts for 
the principal to a minimum. 
By following largely van der Meulen (1998), the 
basic utility function of the principal can be de-
scribed as: 
U  = x(e) - f - c 
where 
U   =  principal’s utility (in wealth) 
x(e) = the profit for the principal from the effort 
of the agent 
f   =  the fees paid by the principal to the agent. 
If the principal chooses to trust the agent, 
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the fee is fixed. If the principal chooses to 
monitor, the fee depends on the outcomes 
and/or the observation of (e). In this case:  
   f = f (x,e) = f * 
c  = other costs involved in obtaining the effort 
of the agent 
In order to adapt this basic formula to our purposes 
we must develop the notions of fees and costs of the 
principal. 
In funding policy, we find two basic ways of allo-
cating money to the scientific system, first, by grant-
ing institutional funds to research institutions and 
second by allocating project funds. The former way 
will be indicated by ‘a’ and the latter by ‘b’. The 
scientist profits both from institutional and project 
funds. We should, however, also distinguish be-
tween two different ways of allocating funding 
money: without conditions attached; and with spe-
cific purposes in mind and obliging scientists to  
respect criteria attached by policy-makers. In the 
former case, the money is fixed and given to the 
agent, in the latter case, the money transferred be-
comes dependent on the effort of the agent for the 
principal and on monitoring. If there are conditions 
attached to either institutional or project funding this 
will be indicated by a star (a*, b*). 
There are two kinds of cost for the principal. First, 
costs that are related to decision-making if policy-
makers decide to use the directed mode of allocating 
funds. In this case they have to specify some goals 
and conditions that scientists have to respect if they 
want to obtain these funding resources (indicated as 
‘C(D)’). Second, if policy-makers decide to control 
what is done with their money they have ‘monitor-
ing costs’ (indicated as ‘C(M)’). Introduced into the 
utility function of policy-makers the formula be-
comes: 
)**( )()()( MDe CCbabaxU +++++−=  
The ‘utility function of the agent’ can in broad terms 
be defined as: 
)()( ee YCfV +−=  
where: 
V  =  agent’s utility function (in wealth and  
effort) 
f   =  fees paid by the principal for the efforts of 
the agent 
C(e)  = costs involved in the efforts of the agent 
for the principal. 
Y(e)  = The yield of his efforts for the agent in 
terms of reputation, career etc. 
If we adapt this formula to funding policy we need 
to replace f again by a and b: 
)()( ee YCbaV +−+=  
The costs of the agent involved in funding policy are 
for example: 
C(T):  The time the agent uses for research for the 
principal. This must be related, however, to 
the estimated effect this research effort has 
for the career purposes of the agent. Ten 
hours used for applied research at the com-
mand of the principal instead of undirected, 
basic research may be a waste for the agent as 
there is no positive effect for the agent, for 
example, in the form of a publication in a sci-
entific review. In this case, the agent looses 
ten hours of his/her time. If, however, there 
are some positive side effects of this research, 
the ten hours weigh less heavily. In quantita-
tive terms, we could say that a small positive 
influence in the form of one article reduces 
these ten hours to, let us say, only eight hours 
that are ‘wasted’. The expression becomes 
therefore: )()( / eT YC  
C(A):  Costs for the acquisition of funding projects 
C(M): Costs stemming from monitoring efforts of 
the principal. 
Taken together the formula becomes: 
V=a+b+a*+b*–(C(T)/Y(e)+C(A)+C(M))+Y(e) 
The costs depend on the institutional environment of 
the agent (embeddedness in a ‘mode 1’ or ‘mode 2’ 
environment, for example).2 Institutions define the 
criteria and opportunities of a scientific career. This 
is why policy-makers have an interest in influencing 
the institutional environment. 
With this analytical tool we are equipped to start 
discussing how policy-makers have dealt with the 
paradox in different periods of funding history. We 
can distinguish two modes of funding policies after 
the war: blind delegation (based on trust) and delega-
tion by incentives (based on incentive contracting).3 
How to deal with delegation in science policy 
Polanyi (1951; 1962) has perhaps formulated in the 
most concise way the predominant method in the 
Funding money can be granted to 
research institutions or project funds: 
it may be allocated without conditions 
attached or with specific purposes in 
mind, obliging scientists to respect 
criteria attached by policy-makers 
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funding policy of countries directly after the war 
until about the 1960s. It may be called ‘blind  
delegation’. 
Blind delegation 
Polanyi’s response to the paradox of funding policy 
was the proposition to trust scientists entirely and 
give them all resources and rights to decide and act 
on their own account. 
Trusting science has been, since the early days of 
science policy (about 1830) the major, but not the 
only, way in which public money has flowed into 
the scientific system, among other things because 
the political system had not yet developed the pro-
fessional expertise either to take decisions in, or to 
control, scientific activities. Specific ideas about 
innovation processes underpinned this kind of dele-
gation. Above all, Vannevar Bush’s famous book 
Science. The endless frontier (Bush, 1990 (1945)) 
has strengthened this option after the Second World 
War as part of the “compact between science and 
government” until about the 80s (Guston, 2000; 
Stokes, 1997; Elzinga and Jamison, 1995). Trusting 
science meant to finance research institutions (uni-
versities included) with institutional funds and to 
allocate funding money via funding agencies for 
investigator-initiated projects (‘global funding’). 
In terms of property rights (see, for example, 
Demsetz, 1967) this practice of allocating funding 
money means that policy-makers are willing to 
transfer all property rights — the right to decide, to 
act, and to control — to the scientific system: Deci-
sions on the contents of science policy are taken by 
scientific policy-advisors, scientific-oriented funding 
agencies and research institutions and their research-
ers. External criteria do not play an important role. 
Scientific institutions and scientists implement sci-
ence policies. 
Policy-makers have neither the knowledge nor the 
means to control the outcomes of these policies and 
do not aspire to do so. In general, they trust the sci-
entific community to establish their own peer-review 
system of control. Scientific quality is accepted as a 
sufficient standard for using public money in re-
search. Science is trusted to deliver, in the medium 
and long term, what society needs (‘science-push 
model’). 
Political intervention imposing external criteria 
would seriously disturb the innovativeness of sci-
ence.4 In taking up recent discussions on delegation, 
this kind of delegation seems to correspond to the 
theoretical notion of the ‘fiduciary’ (see particularly 
Dixit, 1996; Majone, 2001) where policy-makers 
deliberately abstain from any intervention into the 
affairs of ‘independent agencies’ so as not to disturb 
their functioning. 
To describe the relationship between policy-
makers and scientists after the War only in terms of 
the fiduciary is not doing justice to the different 
forms of organising this relationship, but, without 
any doubt, this delegation form has been primordial. 
Even today we find this principle in the mode of  
institutional funding without obligations and in ‘in-
vestigator-initiated’ project funding where only sci-
entists may choose topics and implement their 
research according to rules conducive to their liberty 
of action. Money is given to scientists without at-
taching a sanction to these payments. It is given 
“risk free and unrelated to performance or out-
comes” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, page 208). 
In terms of utility functions this delegation mode 
boils down to the simple expressions: 
)()(
)( )(
Ae
e
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Fees are paid to the ‘agent’, the scientists, without 
specific conditions attached. As the government 
does not engage itself in deciding on the future road 
of science policy nor on priorities, no decision-
making costs are involved and political monitoring 
is not taking place. 
For the agent, there is income, most of the time 
from institutional funds. As he/she can pursue 
his/her scientific activities without taking into con-
sideration external criteria, there are no major costs 
for the agent in accepting the money. The govern-
ment hopes that there is a convergence of the scien-
tific activities of the agent and political interests in 
the medium and long term.5 There are, however, no 
constraints on moral hazard and no guarantee that 
scientists will behave responsibly. 
Delegation by incentives 
Since the 1960s, another mode of delegation in fund-
ing policy is shifting to the foreground juxtaposed 
with blind delegation: the setting of ‘incentives’ in 
the form of ‘price signals’. This has been the start of 
‘science for policy’ and the development of a sci-
ence policy by most governments. Moreover, we can 
contend that this way of allocating funding money 
represents the original principal–agent model. 
In his famous article on the “Republic of science”, 
Polanyi (1962, page 56) demonstrated that the scien-
tific system did not obey the prices on a market but 
had similar mechanisms to co-ordinate action and to 
innovate, that is, signals in the form of publications 
and “current professional standards”. Publications 
are not only the signal that a scientist is doing work 
the scientific community judges as valuable, they are 
also the interconnecting points for the co-ordination 
between otherwise isolated actions of scientists. 
Polanyi did not consider the point that policy-
makers could also give signals to research institu-
tions and scientists, by offering money for activities 
in priority fields of research defined by external  
political criteria alongside the ‘normal’ funds flow-
ing into the scientific system without conditions  
attached. Scientists and their organisations can be 
tempted to direct their work into the thematic direc-
tion formulated by funding agencies and political 
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departments. By choosing a certain research area, 
these agencies and departments are communicating 
that they are prepared to pay an extra price for  
people working in these fields. 
These external price signals increasingly co-
existed alongside the ‘publication signals’ circulat-
ing within the scientific system. Whether these price 
signals were heard by scientists depended on a  
number of factors, not least the financial position of 
research institutions the scientists were working in, 
or, in general, their possibilities of financing the  
research work they would like to pursue. 
To organise delegation in the form of price signals 
to scientists increases political decision-making 
costs in order to formulate priorities. Special peer-
review systems must be organised without always 
having the guarantee that moral hazard and adverse 
selection can be overcome. However, political risks 
can be somewhat reduced in comparison to the trust 
model of delegation. 
In terms of property rights, the government takes 
the responsibility of organising priority-setting in 
research and developing politically induced program 
funding.6 There are prescriptions as to how to pro-
ceed in general terms in implementing the research 
programme but most of the decisions in the execu-
tion of research remain at the operational level. The 
government maintains the right to control though. 
Particularly in the beginning, control was usually 
delegated to the peer-review system of science with 
some special conditions attached. 
We can put the utility functions in the incentive 
mode of delegation like this: 
)()()()(
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The incentive model comes nearer to the genuine 
principal–agent features discussed in the literature 
than the previous model: the principal (the policy-
maker) is attempting to formulate priorities that 
should serve as instructions for the agent (scientists) 
in the execution of research. Scientists maintain rela-
tively high independence in executing the instruc-
tions. They have a genuine interest in pursuing their 
scientific career, which is not flexibly linked to the 
exigencies in political program funding. This means 
that there are clear costs involved for scientists in 
executing political research and incentives to hide 
information from the principal and to reduce their 
efforts for the principal. The principal is therefore 
forced to think about good monitoring procedures 
and measurements of the research output. 
The principal has two options to be sure that the 
agents will do their best to comply with the goals and 
therefore to overcome moral hazard: augmenting the 
relative share of the money with conditions attached 
(b*) (which has been the strategy of the ‘steady state’, 
see below); and/or reducing the costs for the efforts of 
the agent in program research. The incentive mode of 
delegation has used the strategy of giving scientists the 
choice between scientific and politically inspired  
research by adding program funding to the already 
existing global (institutional and project) funding. The 
consequence was that incentives for scientists were 
not very strong as often there was sufficient funding to 
do undirected research and the scientific career was 
firmly anchored within the scientific system. The in-
centive model was, therefore, not able to raise the ef-
forts of scientists linked to political considerations in a 
significant way. 
If we summarise this type of delegation, we can 
state that the incentive mode of funding raises deci-
sion-making costs, monitoring costs and increases 
the danger of moral hazard. Certainly, not a very 
attractive way to solve the paradox! 
Transformation of funding policy 
The models that have been described so far have 
evident deficiencies with regard to attracting the cu-
riosity of scientists to problems of user systems. This 
changed in the 1980s and 1990s with developments 
that were most of the time not inherent to funding 
policies or scientific developments. They were gen-
eral changes in the way the state governs society 
with immediate repercussions on funding policies 
and modes of delegation. I see three such develop-
ments that have changed the outlook of delegation 
today: austerity; contracts; and networks. 
Austerity 
Politics of budget reduction and austerity have been 
introduced in most OECD (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development) countries 
since the end of the 1970s. Ziman has discussed the 
implications for research policy and coined the ex-
pression “steady state” to characterise the constraints 
for research policy making (Ziman, 1987; Cozzens, 
1990). 
In funding policy, the curbing of public money 
was above all used to reduce global institutional 
(‘a’) and project funding (‘b’) (see Senker, 1999), 
thereby generating a structural incentive for scien-
tists to accept political program funding (‘b*’) and 
to look for financial compensation in other func-
tional systems, notably the economic system. The 
Summarising the incentive mode of 
delegation, funding raises decision-
making costs, monitoring costs and 
increases the danger of moral hazard: 
certainly, not a very attractive way to 
solve the paradox 
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choice scientists had had in the incentive mode of 
delegation (between global and directed funding) 
was seriously reduced. Without austerity, the foun-
dations for a change from mode-1 science to mode-2 
science could not have been laid. 
The strengthening of political price signals in the 
aftermath of reduced public resources provoked at 
least two effects. 
First, the phenomenon of the ‘gold rush’. With 
scarce global funding most scientists interested in 
research begin to rush into those areas that seem to 
make the most profit in terms of funding money, that 
is, where the highest (political) prices are paid (see 
Bourdieu, 1975; more recently, Bourdieu, 2001). 
The perverse effects of the gold rush have already 
been adequately put forward by the OECD in its 
1991 report on priority-setting (OECD, 1991). Other 
areas of research of less interest to user systems suf-
fer from ‘malnutrition’ and ‘exhaustion’, with seri-
ous consequences for the innovative capacities of a 
country, given the unpredictability of where future 
innovations will take place (OECD, 1991). In other 
words, the more ‘a’ and ‘b’ are reduced, the more 
scientists will increase their efforts to comply with 
the wishes of the government to the detriment of the 
basic knowledge infrastructure. 
Second, established social hierarchies in the sci-
entific system undergo significant changes. The gold 
rush phenomenon demonstrates this: those research-
ers that are the quickest and the most successful in 
finding funding money eventually become leaders as 
the system is transformed. It is not only the reputa-
tion built on publications but increasingly also that 
generated by the successful acquisition of grants, 
which begins to determine the ‘value’ of researchers 
in the scientific system. This is a long-term process 
but the ‘mode-2’ debate adequately points to the 
changes already accomplished since the 1980s. 
The steady state is therefore a means — certainly 
not conceived as such but strategically used to this 
purpose by funding policy-makers — for a funda-
mental re-orientation of scientific activities. It estab-
lishes a funding market for program-bound and 
short-term funding resources forcing scientists to 
compete for this research money. 
The steady state changes nothing in the allocation 
of property rights compared to the incentive mode of 
delegation. The main effect is on the ‘fee compo-
nent’ of the utility functions. The relative impor-
tance of ‘a’ and ‘b’ on the one hand and ‘b*’ on the 
other hand, begins to change considerably. We could 
state the change like this: while in the incentive 
mode undirected funds were more important than 
directed funds (a + b > b*), the steady state reverses 
this relationship (a + b < b*). 
This change in the relative importance of global 
and directed funding resources puts scientists under 
strain. As austerity does not change the structure, 
dynamics and norms of the scientific system, scien-
tists are obliged to continue their scientific career as 
defined by the scientific community without having 
the same possibilities of doing so as before. As a 
consequence, the costs of scientists engaged in po-
litically- or user-inspired research also increase 
while their return decreases. This is true for all cost 
components (time used for applied research and also 
time for applications and for monitoring costs) 
(C(T+A+M) > Y(e)). 
The principal must therefore be prepared to be 
confronted with a considerable dose of shirking by 
scientists. Moral hazard becomes a likely phenome-
non under the regime of the steady state. This is why 
austerity exacerbates the tensions in funding rela-
tions. Other strategies are needed that attack directly 
the subjective estimation of costs in directed funding 
by scientists. This can only be done by a change of 
the institutional embeddedness of scientific research. 
Contract 
The ‘new public management’ has given rise to re-
flections on a more efficient use of public money 
and a more effective delivery of public services by 
integrating lessons from the principal–agent debate 
(see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The main rationale 
of the new public management is the setting up of 
explicit contracts between the principal and the 
agent, thereby modifying the authority relationship 
between policy-makers and bureaucratic agencies 
into a relationship between contract partners who, 
before the law, have equal rights and who voluntar-
ily agree to exchange resources. The principal is 
paying the agent and defines in broad terms what 
he/she wants while the agent promises to use her/his 
labour power and organisation to implement the 
wishes of the principal. 
This is not different from what has already been 
said about the incentive mode of delegation. New 
public management is not used to revise implicit 
contracts in programme funding between the gov-
ernment (or its representatives, the funding agencies) 
and scientists but reorganises the relationship be-
tween research institutions and the government. 
Delegation by contract means therefore the delega-
tion of property rights to institutions instead of sci-
entists. As scientists are part of these institutions, 
this affects them indirectly. Contracts change the 
institutional embeddedness of scientists. 
The delegation by contract is an 
indirect way of steering the behaviour 
of scientists: it changes the 
‘institutional embeddedness’ of 
scientists in order to avoid moral 
hazard and to increase the social 
responsiveness of scientists 
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In this way, then, the delegation by contract is an 
indirect way of steering the behaviour of scientists. 
It changes the ‘institutional embeddedness’ of scien-
tists in order to avoid moral hazard and to increase 
the social responsiveness of scientists. As a conse-
quence, the setting of incentives for individual scien-
tists should become more successful in terms of 
moral hazard, social responsibility and adverse  
selection because the incentive mode of delegation is 
embedded in the delegation by contract to research 
institutions (and the steady state). We have, there-
fore a kind of ‘nested delegation’.7 
In what way are explicit contracts in the style of 
the new public management a promising device to 
guarantee a maximum of effort of ‘corporate’ agents 
for the sakes of the principal? This is the question of 
how to set up the contract so that opportunistic be-
haviour of research organisations (and their scien-
tists) can be avoided. A contract relationship 
between policy-makers and scientific organisations 
“could solve the motivation problem [or moral 
hazard]. It would specify precisely what each 
party is to do in every possible circumstance 
and arrange the distribution of realized costs 
and benefits in each contingency (including 
those where the contract’s terms are violated) 
so that each party individually finds it optimal 
to abide by the contract’s terms.” (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992, page 127) 
The problem is that only in ideal circumstances will 
all information concerning the specification of such a 
contract be available. Complete contracts are seldom 
found. This is why the principal–agent literature has 
focused on ‘incomplete contracts’ taking into ac-
count that actors suffer from ‘bounded rationality’ 
and misperception and that there are a large number 
of contingencies and unforeseen events, which might 
change in the future and which are not adequately 
dealt with in the contract. In matters of funding pol-
icy, contingencies seem to play a particularly impor-
tant role. How, then, can contracts, despite their lack 
of completeness, be set up in such a way that they 
can reduce the opportunism of agents? 
In fact, new public management has used  
“relational contracting” to overcome problems of 
incomplete contracts: 
• Rather than specifying in detail what to do, prin-
cipals use “general provisions that are broadly ap-
plicable” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, page 131); 
• The agent is given operational freedom, that is, 
“no detailed bargaining about what precise action 
the employee will take in various circumstances” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, page 132). 
This has two consequences. First, policy-makers are 
obliged to invest into decision-making even though 
the political guidelines may remain very general.  
A certain degree of guidance by the principal is  
inherent to new public management. Policy-makers 
have more time to specify guidelines (“steering, not 
rowing”, compare with Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) 
but bear decision costs to do so. Delegation by con-
tract does not end steering or guidance in science 
policy, although it is not excluded that research insti-
tutions are asked to make proposals in this respect, 
which are then more or less adopted by policy-
makers or among which policy-makers choose. 
However, there are binding decisions by the gov-
ernment (or its representatives) in the end and re-
search institutions and scientists are required to 
respect these in their research choices. 
In this sense, delegation by contract is not differ-
ent from delegation by incentives.8 Both are forms 
of delegation where decision-making costs exist for 
policy-makers and where the interests of policy-
makers constrain the choices of scientists and their 
institutions. The choice of what to do is not left to 
scientists and their institutions. In delegation by con-
tract, the general objectives of the institutions are 
stipulated in the contracts. In politically inspired  
research programs thematic priorities are pre-given. 
Secondly, new public management has reinforced 
another component in the utility functions — the 
costs of monitoring. Although agents are given op-
erational freedom of action, this does not mean that 
the principal trusts agents completely. On the con-
trary, new public management is the continuation of 
modernisation and rationality in the sense of Max 
Weber only by other means (Frissen, 1998). We find 
considerable and sophisticated efforts in contract 
relationships — and this has spilled over to pro-
gramme funding — to elaborate how exactly the 
work of research institutions and scientists can be 
monitored adequately. A large number of evaluation 
procedures have been established and refined indica-
tors of output measurement have been developed to 
reassure the principal that there will be no moral 
hazard. 
In comparison to the incentive model of delega-
tion there are three obvious changes: 
• Even institutional funds are now partly distributed 
with a purpose in mind and after negotiations with 
the government (a*). The conditions are fixed 
within the contracts. Both ‘a’ and ‘b’ can be cur-
tailed under a regime of the steady state. In this 
case the expression becomes: a + b < a* + b*. 
• Decision-making costs (C(D)) are increasing for 
the government because global guidelines have to 
be developed even when this does not mean a 
stronger form of intervention. 
• Monitoring costs (C(M)) are rising considerably 
both for the principal and the agent, at least in the 
beginning of the ‘contract system’. 
Although we could guess that the predominance of 
directed funds will have the same effects as in the 
case of the steady state (that is, leading to a situation 
where the costs for the agents are higher than the 
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return of his actions for the principal) this is not the 
case. The costs for scientists are decreasing. How? 
The answer lies in the ‘nested’ process: The 
steady state has started to reduce global funding and 
obliges both research institutions and individual sci-
entists to accept directed funding resources. A use of 
these directed funding resources can, moreover, be 
fixed in the contracts between research institutions 
and the government. Research institutions become 
corporate actors obliged to compete on a directed 
funding market and to open up to the demands of 
user systems. 
At the same time, scientists within these organisa-
tions are obliged to work within the confines defined 
by their research institutions. This forces them to 
search actively for grants on the directed funding 
market. As research institutions begin to change, 
career structures of scientists begin also to change. 
Organisational incentives help to create a new 
scientific élite that is situated more at the junction 
between the scientific and user systems than in the 
scientific system alone. This changes ‘Y(e)’: the re-
turn from activities in applied-oriented research in-
creases. Therefore, the new élites regard the time 
costs involved in executing politically or user-
induced research as less problematic than do old 
élites. Consequently, the costs for the efforts of sci-
entists to benefit the government begin to decrease, 
even if application costs and monitoring costs are 
rising. If the return for the agent increases then the 
costs depend on how large ‘C(T)/Y(e)’ becomes in  
relation to ‘C(A)’ and ‘C(M)’. 
There are two points to consider in this respect. 
On one hand, we can assume that, in the long run, 
monitoring costs can decrease because changing ca-
reer structures will diminish the incentive for moral 
hazard. Diminish monitoring costs would make it 
more likely that the returns for the agent become 
higher than costs. 
On the other hand, we should not overestimate 
these developments: There are indications that 
changing career structures in the direction of ‘mode 
2’ affects only certain parts of the scientific commu-
nity, mostly working in the rapidly developing areas 
of biology, biomedicine, nanotechnology and so on. 
There are large parts of the community not consider-
ing it worthwhile to invest into the applied-oriented 
areas, and universities and other research institutions 
do not feel obliged to change career conditions for 
all of their staff. While, therefore, some scientists 
will evaluate time costs less high than before, others 
will not. This gives rise to two kinds of agents with 
different utilities. 
This makes the evaluation of changes for the prin-
cipal ambiguous: although the costs for monitoring 
and decision-making are rising considerably in the 
short run, the return from those agents dedicated to 
‘mode 2’ will be higher, but this will not be the case 
for those agents not integrated into the applied-
oriented research developments. 
We see that the steady state and delegation by 
contract create structural conditions that strengthen 
the position of the government in the paradox of 
funding policy. While austerity raises tensions be-
tween a scientific career and user-inspired research, 
these tensions are alleviated by the contract mode of 
delegation, at least for a part of the scientific com-
munity. Scientific careers become embedded in a 
new institutional context that makes the trespassing 
of the boundaries of the scientific system easier. Sci-
entific institutions lose their independence in the 
sense of Ben-David, but neither these institutions 
nor the scientists engaged in the new course seem to 
deplore this situation. 
Delegation to networks 
While we can see this reorientation in government 
policy as a form of ‘modernising’ funding policy by 
more information, guidance, operational freedom 
and monitoring, delegation to networks follows a 
completely different, ‘post-modern’ rationale of ac-
tion (see also Rip and van der Meulen, 1996).9 The 
background of this discourse is how to link scientific 
knowledge production to other user systems without 
submitting scientific production to the logic of user 
systems. While the modern approach underlines 
competition and rationality, the ‘post-modern’ ac-
centuates co-operation and reflexivity. 
The foundations underlying this discourse are 
fundamentally different from the ‘modern’ ap-
proach. They can briefly be explained by presenting 
the three major components: systemic thinking, 
knowledge sharing, and the state as a facilitator. 
Systemic thinking 
Systemic thinking can be demonstrated by putting 
forward two main principles — connectivity and 
indeterminacy. 
The debate on “innovation systems” (Edquist, 
1997; Lundvall, 1993; Nelson, 1993) is perhaps the 
best example to illustrate systemic thinking: Techno-
logical innovation is understood as part of a wider en-
vironment. Funding technological innovation is not 
any longer just putting funding money in the right way 
and in the right places in order to pick out the ‘win-
ners’ but necessitates also a reflection on the political, 
social and cultural embeddedness of innovation. 
Metcalfe and Gheorghiou (1998) therefore de-
mand a new policy rationale recognising the “ambi-
guity and uncertainty of the policy environment and 
the futility of picking winners as distinct from en-
couraging winners”. We need the “strengthening of 
the innovation process in general” by acknowledg-
ing the “principle of connectivity — the bridging 
together more effectively of the different actions and 
institutions involved in the innovation process.” 
(Metcalfe and Gheorghiou, 1998, page 94). The 
principle of connectivity becomes therefore a major 
concern of action in the new funding policies. 
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Systemic thinking also denounces a notion of ra-
tionality characterised by causality, linearity, and 
reversibility (Bechtle, 1994). In a complex world, 
we face contingency, recursiveness, and indetermi-
nacy. It therefore no longer makes sense to optimise 
our behaviour by forward planning. A dynamic, non-
linear system cannot be controlled. It is better to 
have systems, organisations, or actors capable of 
learning by doing, of developing structures that can 
react flexibly and adapt, and of ‘self-organising’. We 
should not reduce contingencies but attempt to live 
with them, live with indeterminacy as a basic ele-
ment of action.10 We need organisations to be ‘open’ 
to the environment but also possessing the capacity 
of operational closure to reduce complexity (see also 
Nowotny et al, 2001). 
This dynamic concept is incompatible with any 
vision of contracts, even with the remedies offered 
in the concept of ‘relational contracting’ discussed 
above: we cannot predetermine the products to de-
liver; we cannot oblige organisations any more to do 
this or that and be accountable for it. 
Knowledge sharing 
Next to the principles of connectivity and indetermi-
nacy stands the principle of knowledge sharing. 
While for von Hayek (1945) the set-up of a knowl-
edge-sharing society is still entirely a question of 
price mechanisms, I would defend the point of view 
that it becomes a matter of organising interaction 
spaces and networks (see Ben-David, 1971). It is 
here that the ‘new, post-modern funding policies’ 
are finding their main areas of action. 
Knowledge sharing is the quintessence of network 
forms in research. By networks, I mean the volun-
tary participation of actors in a research project of 
common profit for all participants. The notion of 
network also points to the ‘temporary’ character of 
such enterprises: They can be created, used, and dis-
solved. In this sense, they are perhaps the adequate 
organisational answer to the problems of complexity 
and indeterminacy. 
Networks are, moreover, non-hierarchical, estab-
lishing a win–win situation for all participants. A 
large number of new funding instruments (such as 
the Leading Technological Institutes in the Nether-
lands, the Pôles de Recherche Nationaux in Switzer-
land, or the Verbundpolitik in Germany) are 
implementing this logic. Networks are a unique form 
of linking organisations, of linking actors and of 
linking systems without perverting their identity or 
their embeddedness in different environments. This 
is the difference from the steady state and the mode 
of delegation by contract where the scientific system 
is forced to open up to user systems. Instead of es-
tablishing the logic of competition, they induce an 
attitude of openness and trust, which, according to a 
large number of studies on the ‘social capital’ are 
quite effective attitudes for welfare creation (Put-
nam, 1993; 1995). Networks therefore keep the iden-
tity of actors and attempt to find a solution for 
‘systemic integration’. 
State as a facilitator 
What does this mean for funding policies? It 
means above all the willingness to organise, develop 
knowledge sharing, and thus give the means to re-
search institutions and scientists to self-organise in-
novation networks with user systems. In the context 
of organisational complexity, the state loses preten-
sions of instrumental guidance and “Olympian ra-
tionality” (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998) and 
becomes a facilitator of co-ordination processes. The 
focus of government activities in general and of sci-
ence policy in particular becomes not the manipula-
tion of the behaviour of scientists but the creation of 
interaction spaces, the reduction of transaction costs 
for inter-systemic and interdisciplinary co-operation 
and the maintenance of vigorous, self-organising 
systems. “Management of interdependence” (see 
Mayntz, 1996, page 156) and not steering of  
scientific behaviour characterises the new funding 
policy. 
More concretely, this means that policy-makers in 
funding policy abandon pretensions of medium- and 
long-term priority-setting meticulously laid out in 
directed funding schemes. The management of in-
terdependence envisages the delegation of the right 
to decide and act to research networks, which have 
been constructed with the help of the government 
but which function independently of governmental 
influence. Although general topics may have been 
fixed, such networks should have the possibility of 
changing topics, adapting to circumstances, and 
finding idiosyncratic ways of innovation. This 
means that it is not possible to stipulate all proce-
dures or products in advance. Innovation in net-
works is an open process and the best that 
government can do is to guarantee the best condi-
tions of action for these networks (see in particular 
AWT, 2001a; 2001b). 
Delegation to networks therefore needs a consid-
erable degree of trust. The right to control remains at 
the level of the government. Nevertheless, such talks 
or evaluation cannot refer to goals and indicators in 
In a complex world, we face 
contingency, recursiveness, and 
indeterminacy, so we need systems, 
organisations, or actors capable of 
learning by doing, of developing 
structures that can react flexibly and 
adapt, and of ‘self-organising’ 
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the same way as in the delegation by contract as they 
are not a priori defined and controllable. An evalua-
tion can only control the process of the working of 
the network. 
What does it mean for the utility functions? The 
first change that must be introduced in the utility 
function of the government is that profits depend not 
only on scientists but also on industry or other users 
co-operating within the network. This is why we 
would need to add ‘z(e)’ indicating the effort of par-
ticipants other than scientists in the network. More-
over, we could add a new utility function ‘Z’ 
characterising the utility of these other participants. 
For reasons of simplicity, I will not do this here. 
In contrast to the delegation by contract, no condi-
tions are attached here to institutional funds (so, it is 
‘a’ and not ‘a*’). The payments for project funding, 
however, contain these conditions, though they are 
much less specific than in the contracting mode of 
delegation (‘b*’). Decision-making costs (‘C(D)’) for 
the government are considerably reduced because 
most decisions are delegated to the network and 
monitoring costs (‘C(M)’) are considerably reduced 
because of difficulties in defining adequate measures 
of control. Nevertheless, they are still there. This 
makes clear that overall costs for the principal are 
decreasing while returns are likely to increase (x(e)< 
a+b*+C(D)+C(M)). 
Why are returns likely to increase? This depends 
on the utility function of the agent. First, we must 
add costs for co-operation (‘C(c)’) while the costs for 
monitoring are considerably decreasing. Most im-
portantly, though, we can contend that scientists 
working in innovation networks consider the re-
search activities within the network not as a loss of 
time, which is detrimental to their scientific career 
(‘Y(e)’ is increasing). Participants are a selected 
group of dedicated scientists analogous to the ‘mode 
2’ scientists we have encountered in the contract 
mode of funding. Networks have the apparent ad-
vantage of being temporary and of respecting the 
fundamental interests of participants. Networks 
maintain functional differentiation but permit volun-
tary co-operation. This reduces the costs for scien-
tists participating in these networks (especially the 
costs in time and monitoring). 
In sum, although time costs used for research in 
these kinds of networks are increasing and applica-
tion costs may be high, monitoring costs are decreas-
ing and the expected return ‘Y(e)’ is high largely 
outstripping the costs. Delegation to networks is 
therefore a way to reduce moral hazard and increase 
the social responsibility of science while also reduc-
ing political costs of decision-making. 
Delegation to networks is a new way of dealing 
with the paradox in funding policy. Scientific inde-
pendence of institutions and researchers is respected 
while scientific research is increasingly becoming 
responsive to the needs of industry and society. The 
role of the government is limited to the management 
of interdependence but the co-operation with users 
within these networks guarantees that scientific be-
haviour is directed to the needs of society. 
Conclusions 
I have endeavoured in this article to give an over-
view of the different ways we find in the history of 
funding policy to deal with the problem of the func-
tional differentiation of science and the connected 
problem of delegation. The functional differentiation 
of science evokes the problem of the linkage of sci-
entific knowledge with contexts of application situ-
ated in other functional systems. The delegation of 
property rights to scientific institutions and scientists 
is the way government attempts to make scientists 
contribute to the welfare of society. Delegation pro-
vokes typical governance problems, above all how 
to make sure that delegated scientists and their insti-
tutions will do their best in this respect instead of 
promoting their own welfare, that is, their scientific 
career. Table 1 summarises the outcomes of each 
Table 1. Delegation models in funding policy 
Model Responsiveness Moral hazard Monitoring costs/ 
performance measure 
Decision-making  
costs 
Blind delegation Low Low Low 
Scientific Publications 
Low 
Incentive mode Increasing High Increasing 
Practical solutions presented in research reports 
and advisory bodies 
Increasing 
Steady state Increasing Very high Increasing 
Efficient use of resources and practical solutions 
Increasing 
Contract mode High Decreasing High 
Thorough evaluation of output defined and  
operationalised in contract 
High 
Networks High Low Decreasing 
Process-related measures concerning network 
quality 
Low 
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model in terms of responsiveness, moral hazard, 
monitoring, and decision-making costs for the  
principal. 
It was shown that we find two delegation models 
in the ‘classic’, ‘mode 1’ period of funding policy 
(blind delegation and incentives) and three delega-
tion models in the more recent ‘mode 2’ period. 
Blind delegation cannot be regarded as a classical 
principal–agent relationship as all property rights (to 
decide, to act, to control) are delegated to scientists. 
In this way, there is simply no moral hazard, as the 
agents have no motive to shirk. They are required to 
do what they will do anyway, that is, basic research 
to promote their scientific career. This is why scien-
tific publications are the main indicator of good per-
formance. The principal pays but he has no other 
costs. The tension is resolved in favour of the inde-
pendence of science. 
The incentive mode of funding exercises pressure 
on scientists and attempts to increase responsiveness 
by using directed funding. As this conflicts with the 
basic research orientation of scientists, moral hazard 
becomes likely. The setting up of a science policy in 
terms of programme funds increases the costs for the 
principal. Monitoring becomes more costly as now it 
must be judged to what extent scientists have pre-
sented solutions to societal and political problems in 
their research. The tension begins to exacerbate. 
The ‘steady state’ manipulates the relative impor-
tance of global and directed funding, thereby reduc-
ing the options of scientists to engage themselves in 
investigator-initiated research. The simple use of 
austerity measures sharpens the tension between  
curiosity-oriented and user-inspired research and 
polarises positions on the paradox of funding policy. 
Austerity is not a solution to the paradox but  
prepares the ground for a stronger orientation of 
scientists to user systems. Monitoring and decision-
making costs remain at the same level as in the  
former incentive mode of funding but the efficient 
use of resources becomes an additional dimension of 
output control. 
The delegation by contract, based on the ‘new 
public management’ is, in contrast to the ‘steady 
state’, another mode of delegation but this time 
clearly directed to research (and funding) organisa-
tions and not to individual scientists. The main point 
is that the introduction of relational contracting with 
research organisations has immediate repercussions 
on the utility functions of individual scientists and 
therefore on their behaviour. It changes the ‘institu-
tional embeddedness’ of scientists’ actions. 
This ‘nested delegation’ provides the basis for a 
more fundamental reorientation of scientific behav-
iour and opens the scientific system to user systems. 
The reason for this is that scientific careers are, at 
least in part, less straightforwardly anchored within 
the reputation mechanisms and the credibility cycle 
(compare with Latour and Woolgar, 1979) of the 
scientific system but become more strongly con-
nected to the performance at the ‘edge’ of scientific 
research with user systems. Consequently, the esti-
mated costs for the efforts of scientists in politically 
or user-inspired funding are decreasing and moral 
hazard becomes less likely. 
The costs for the principal are, however, very high 
in terms of monitoring and decision-making but be-
come outstripped by the return from the activities of 
the agent. The high monitoring costs appear in the 
thorough and encompassing evaluation procedures 
of the output of institutions (and scientists), which 
have been defined ex ante in the contracts. The out-
put may now be different: scientific publications but 
also the innovation of existing procedures and prod-
ucts, or the advice given to different actors in society 
and the political system. 
Delegation to networks follows a completely dif-
ferent rationale from the delegation by contract. 
Delegation to networks does not follow up the 
steady state and the delegation by contract but is a 
“second pendulum swing” (compare with Mayntz, 
1997) of funding policies today. This means that all 
these tendencies co-exist and that they are in many 
ways opposing each other, in discourses and in the 
actual practice of policy-making. Delegation to net-
works is the recognition that government has no  
serious means or instruments to guide the unpredict-
able process of discovery and innovation. The dele-
gation of the ‘right to decide and act’ in funding 
policy to ‘inter-systemic networks’ is the conse-
quence of this thinking. 
The main difference with the steady state and the 
delegation by contract is that the delegation to net-
works builds upon scientists and research institu-
tions, which keep their identity as scientific 
institutions anchored within the scientific system but 
which have an inherent interest, based in the chang-
ing dynamics of scientific discovery, to engage 
themselves in networks with users. Maintenance of 
identity and self-organisation are the main princi-
ples. In this way, the costs for the efforts of scien-
tists in politically and user-inspired funding 
programmes are also decreasing but the background 
is different from the contract mode of delegation. 
Monitoring costs decrease as they are no longer  
output-oriented but process-related, which needs less 
preparation and less thorough procedures. 
Both modes of delegation — by contract and to 
networks — are powerful ways of reducing the ten-
sions in the paradox of funding policy. They are 
successful because they are not attempting to steer 
the behaviour of scientists but rather the institutional 
environment of scientific action. In this way, the 
costs for the efforts of scientists in politically and 
user-inspired research programmes — the most im-
portant component with regard to the moral hazard 
of scientists — are reduced. 
I see, nevertheless, a different solution with  
regard to the lasting tensions in funding policy:  
delegation by contract is based on ‘independent sci-
entific institutions’ but only in the sense of opera-
tional freedom while delegation to networks trusts in 
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the self-organisation of independent institution. 
Delegation by contract envisages a steering by gov-
ernment ‘at arm’s length’ but we find an active role 
of the government in the prescription of scientific 
action while the delegation to networks takes the 
role of the state back. 
Government becomes a facilitator of self-
organised co-operation networks. It seems to me 
therefore that delegation to networks embodies, at 
least in theory, the most adequate way of dealing 
with the paradox in research policies: reducing the 
direct influence of the state in funding policies, re-
spect for the independence of scientific institutions, 
fostering of ‘vigorous’ scientific institutions, and a 
strong commitment of scientists to user interests. 
Notes 
1. Most of this work is directed to the description of the role of 
funding agencies in science policy. I will deal with the direct re-
lationship of policy-makers and scientists (and their research 
organisations). 
2. See for the distinction between “mode 1” and “mode 2” sci-
ence: (Gibbons et al, 1994). Mode 1 science is characterised 
by a relatively differentiated scientific system and a compre-
hension of scientific knowledge in terms of certainty, linearity, 
predictability and control. Mode 2 science characterises a 
more open scientific system, interdisciplinary research, and “a 
multiplication and social diffusion of the sites at which knowl-
edge is produced” (Nowotny et al, 2001, page 16) as well as 
the rise of the notions of ‘uncertainty ‘, ‘ambiguity ‘, ‘fluidity ‘ 
and ‘self-organisation ‘. 
3. Two other ways to deal with the paradox can be mentioned. 
They are rather exceptions in OECD countries: the Soviet-like 
‘hierarchical delegation’ and delegation based on ‘moral obli-
gation’, which is found in periods of serious crisis such as 
wars. 
4. In the words of Polanyi: “Controlling, fostering etc. the pursuit 
of a free scientific inquiry, contradicts the generally accepted 
opinion that modern science is founded on a total rejection of 
authority” (Polanyi, 1962, page 67) and “In the case of scien-
tists, the explorers strive towards a hidden reality, for the sake 
of intellectual satisfaction. And as they satisfy themselves, 
they enlighten all men and are thus helping society to fulfil its 
obligation towards intellectual self-improvement” (Polanyi, 
1962, page 72) 
5. Note that here we do not have a principal–agent problem in 
the proper sense, as the agent has no reason to hide anything 
from the principal. They are just doing what they think is best 
for their own scientific career. Interests of the principal and the 
agent converge in this respect. 
6. It does not mean that scientists are excluded from priority-
setting. As a matter of fact, the OECD (1991) reports that 
priority-setting is an interactive process in which we can hardly 
distinguish between the different actors contributing to policy 
formulation. The difference with the trust model and moral ob-
ligation is, however, that the government is responsible for the 
organisation and that it can decide to just choose priorities on 
its own. 
7. In fact, this is comparable to Tsebelis’ notion of “nested 
games” (Tsebelis, 1990): Principal–agent delegation can be 
seen as one game taking place between a political department 
responsible for research programmes and scientists about the 
implementation of a research programme, while this game is 
embedded into a larger game between the research institution 
and policy-makers defining the institutional constraints of sci-
entists. In our case, the pay-offs, rules and constraints of the 
higher-order game (delegation by contract) change the pa-
rameters in the lower-order game (delegation by incentives). 
8. They are both genuine expressions of the principal–agent 
model. 
9. It is one of the interesting points today that we have at the 
same time attempts to ‘rationalise’ policy-making and attempts 
to overcome the traditional notion of ‘rationality’ (Frissen, 
1998). Mayntz (1997, page 69) sees in a similar way one 
move to the “market” and a second one to “networks”. Both 
tendencies result in different modifications of the delegation to 
scientists. 
10. This is the essence of chaos theory and “autopoiesis”; see Kiel 
(1994) and Thiétart and Forgues (1995). 
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